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Abstract—This  paper  describes  a  novel  approach  to  semantic 
system  and  security  modelling  developed  in  the  SERSCIS 
project.  The  approach  is  designed  to  address  dynamic  multi-
stakeholder systems that are composed from services at run-time. 
This presents several challenges for security risk modelling and 
management that are not well addressed by previous work. The 
biggest challenge is the fact that at design-time one only knows 
the structure but not the composition of the system, forcing an 
abstract modelling approach to be used. The SERSCIS approach 
deals  with  this  by  defining  a  set  of  OWL  classes  describing 
generic  system  assets,  threats  and  security  controls  and  the 
relationships between them. This dependability model captures 
security expertise concerning the types of threats that can arise in 
general and the controls that can be used to address them. An 
abstract  system  model  can  then  be  created  using  OWL 
subclasses, to capture the types of assets and their relationships 
in a specific system, but still without specifying how many assets, 
where they are deployed or what security controls they have. The 
resulting  models  can  be  used  as  inputs  to  run-time  semantic 
monitoring tools, where the knowledge encoded in the abstract 
system  model is used to automatically determine system threat 
activity and system vulnerabilities. The approach was validated 
in an Airport Collaborative Decision-Making scenario. 
Keywords-component; semantics; modelling; security 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
The  SERSCIS  project  [13]  aims  to  address  the  growing 
need to manage risks in Critical Infrastructure arising from or 
amplified  by  information  system  interconnections  between 
different stakeholders. Increased connectivity is being driven 
by the need for efficiency. By sharing data, the organizations 
involved  in  running  critical  infrastructure  can predict events 
and  manage  resources  more  effectively.  Wider  access  to 
information also encourages competition, e.g. by requesting a 
service at some future time, so different suppliers can bid to 
provide it. 
But information sharing also increases vulnerabilities due 
to three effects: 
  attacks can be made against the information systems or 
communication  channels,  disrupting  the  flow  or  the 
integrity of exchanged data; 
  local disruption in one organization can lead to more 
problems elsewhere due to the dependency of others on 
data from the disrupted party; and 
  the  use  of  exchanged  data  to  increase  efficiency 
usually leads to a reduction in excess capacity, and so 
reduces resilience against any type of disruption. 
For example, under the Single European Skies initiative, 
the use of airspace in Europe is managed by Eurocontrol, an 
international  agency  that  seeks  to  optimize  the  flow  of  air 
traffic by assigning take-off and landing slots at airports in real 
time. To do this, Eurocontrol defines a collaborative decision-
making  process  (CDM)  in  which  national  air  traffic  control 
services  share  information  via  Eurocontrol.  The  CDM 
approach  is  now  being  extended  to  airport  operations  (A-
CDM), allowing aircraft ground handling operators to provide 
predictions of when aircraft will be ready to take off. The chain 
of interconnections means air traffic control in Europe could be 
disrupted by attacks on or problems of airport service providers 
that handle tasks like aircraft refuelling, baggage handling, etc.  
The SERSCIS project is addressing these issues by treating 
the  information  systems  in  a  critical  infrastructure  as  a 
dynamically  composed,  multi-stakeholder,  service-oriented 
system. Dynamic service oriented architectures can be used to 
reconfigure  information  flows  in  the  event  of  a  problem, 
providing a dynamic response to mitigate its effects locally or 
on  other  parts  of  the  network.  The  problem  is  that  the  risk 
management methods used in critical infrastructure are based 
on design-time analysis of information security threats [3,7,10], 
as typified by the procedures used in the Single European Skies 
research  initiative  SESAR  [15]. These  methods  cannot cope 
with  dynamic,  multi-stakeholder  systems.  To  overcome  this 
limitation, SERSCIS has developed a novel approach to system 
modelling, designed to support threat modelling and analysis in 
dynamic, multi-stakeholder systems. The approach is based on 
the use of semantic modelling, so machine reasoning can be 
used to automate the analysis of threats when the system is 
composed  at  run-time.  In  contrast  to  other  approaches,  the 
design-time models are abstract, describing the structure but 
not the composition of the system (which is not known until 
run-time).  The  models  are  also  stakeholder-centric,  ensuring 
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 that they can be used to interpret system behaviour and threats 
at run-time from the point of view of an individual stakeholder, 
using  only  system  configuration  and  status  information 
available  to  them.  This  paper  focuses  on  the  modelling 
approach  developed  in  the  SERSCIS  project,  leaving  other 
aspects such as policy modelling and run-time monitoring and 
risk management to be detailed in other publications [11]. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section II 
we compare our modelling approach to the state of the art in 
risk  and  security  modelling  approaches.  In  section  III  we 
present  the  layered  SERSCIS  models  (Core,  Dependability, 
Abstract and Concrete). In section IV, we present a detailed 
validation scenario used to evaluate our approach and finally in 
section V, we conclude with a description of future work. 
II.  RELATIONSHIP TO THE STATE OF THE ART 
A.  Risk Management 
As  noted  above,  state  of  the  art  risk  management 
methodologies  such  as  COBIT  [2],  and  ISO  27005  [9]  are 
based  on  analysis  of  information  security  risks  for  a  given 
system design and configuration. The analysis allows system 
vulnerabilities to be detected, and associated risks quantified. If 
the risk is too great to be accepted, strategies are defined to 
reduce the risk (using security controls), avoid the risk (by not 
using  the  vulnerable  system  feature)  or  transfer  the  risk  to 
someone  else  (by  outsourcing  system  functions,  or  insuring 
against  potential  losses).  In  most  methodologies,  the 
effectiveness of control strategies must be monitored, and if 
necessary the analysis is revisited, e.g. if new vulnerabilities 
are  discovered,  or  threats  prove  more  likely  than  expected. 
However, the approach is essentially a design-time approach, 
in which changes are effected by amending the system design 
(e.g. adding new controls), having security experts analyse the 
new design to check the changes will have the desired effect, 
and  then  adding  controls  to  the  system.  In  a  dynamically 
composed  service-oriented  architecture  this  approach  is  not 
sufficient  for  two  reasons.  There  is  no  conventional  system 
design  including  controls:  the  system  composition  changes 
during run  time  as  services are  added  removed or  replaced, 
each  service  having  its  own  controls  that  may  differ  from 
others  of  its  type.  And  there  is  no  time  for  a  conventional 
security  expert  analysis  of  system  changes  that  occur 
dynamically.  
Matulevicius et al [3] present work on a graphical approach 
to  identify,  explain  and  document  security  threats  and  risk 
scenarios. A graphical notation was developed to perform the 
five  phases  needed  for  security  analysis  1.  Context 
establishment, 2. Risk identification, 3. Risk estimation, 4. Risk 
evaluation  and  5.  Treatment  identification.  Diagrams  are 
created during each of these steps (similar to UML models) 
under the guidance of a domain expert. We have followed a 
similar  approach  for  the  identification  of  threats  and  their 
mitigation strategies. However, the work done by [3] does not 
go beyond the modelling phase (diagrammatic modelling). The 
novelty of our SERSCIS system modelling approach is that we 
use an abstract modelling approach (OWL ontology based) to 
address  the  challenge  faced  in  adaptive  systems  (where  the 
composition of the system is not known in advance). Further, 
we go beyond the modelling stage and integrate our ontologies 
into  the  runtime  dynamic  stakeholder  system.  The  concrete 
model  (instance  information)  is  automatically  generated  at 
runtime depending upon the current composition of the system. 
Work  by  [8]  uses  an  extension  of  the  Secure  Tropos 
language  to  support  the  modelling  of  security  risks.  The 
domain  model  is  mainly  structured  around  three  groups  of 
concepts: asset-related concepts, risk-related concepts and risk-
treatment related concepts. Further security criteria for each of 
these assets are identified in terms of confidentiality, integrity 
and  availability.  This  work  is  an  extension  of  the  work  on 
Secure  Tropos,  and  includes  the  development  of  syntactic, 
semantic  and  methodological  extensions  that  would  support 
security risks and their counter measures. This representation is 
in  a  diagrammatic  in  nature  and  is  used  to  present  abstract 
syntax elements for risk modelling and the rules on how these 
can be combined together. The domain model in [8] is similar 
to the core ontology model we use in SERSCIS (consisting of 
Threat, Asset and Control). The risk modelling approach we 
used during the brain storming session uses features from both 
[3] and [8], however, in SERSCIS we use OWL ontologies to 
model  Core,  Dependability  and  Abstract  system  models  in 
addition to the diagrammatic representations. This allows our 
models to be much more expressive (due to expressive nature 
of OWL syntax) and encoded in a way such that existing rule 
based languages (e.g. SWRL) and DL reasoners (e.g. Hermit) 
can  be  used  with  these  OWL  ontologies  for  the  automatic 
identification and mitigation of threats.  
B.  Security Modelling and Machine Reasoning 
One  approach  that  could  address  the  second  of  these 
problems (unknown composition of dynamic multi-stakeholder 
systems) is to use machine reasoning to analyse risks, so this 
can be done rapidly whenever the system composition changes. 
There is an existing body of research into how one might create 
semantic  models  of  a  system  to  support  such  an  automated 
analysis,  though  with  the  motive  of  capturing  security 
standards and expertise so tools can be developed to support 
non-experts.  A  useful  overview  is  provided  by  [1].  For 
example, the NRL Security Ontology [10] provides a way to 
describe the security properties of Web Services, which was 
later used as a starting point for a Web Service vulnerabilities 
ontology [16]. The Ontology of Information Security [7] by 
Herzog  et  al  describes  a  system  in  terms  of  assets, 
vulnerabilities and threats, so making the link to system risks 
(via  threat  models).  However,  this  ontology  uses  N-ary 
relationships making it hard to deduce security properties via 
machine reasoning. 
The Security Ontology [5] from Secure Business Austria 
(SBA) uses only conventional RDF relationships, and captures 
security threats and controls from the German IT Grundschutz 
Manual  [6],  so  providing  a  way  to  model  systems  with 
common threats and control strategies. The SBA approach goes 
a long way towards the goal of capturing security expertise in a 
form that can be reused (with supporting tools) by non-experts. 
 
 
Second SESAR Innovation Days, 27
th – 29
th November 2012 
 
 
2 
Figure 1.   Core SERSCIS ontology 
 
Asset Threat
Control
threatens
protects
blocks/
mitigates
(SWRL
rules)
affects
1 Induced
Behaviour
(T,F)
Level
Classification
(H,M,L)
Description
(String)
Likelihood
1≥[float]≥0
hasCurrent
Likelihood
hasPrior
Likelihood
1
has
Description
has
Severity
Level
uses
hasInduced
BehaviourMetric
1
1
1
1
 
Figure 2.   Dependability model logical asset types 
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However, this ontology describes only deployed systems and 
security  controls,  and  cannot  be  used  to  create  an  abstract 
system  model  for  a  dynamically  composed  system  whose 
concrete composition is not known at design time. The SBA 
approach also makes extensive use of Web Ontology Language 
(OWL)  instances,  which  makes  it  hard  to  cater  for  multi-
stakeholder  systems  where  it  is  often  necessary  to  attach 
different  properties  to  the  same  threat  depending  on  which 
stakeholder or sub-domain is targeted. 
III.  SERSCIS SYSTEM MODELS 
A.  SERSCIS Approach and Core Ontology 
The SERSCIS approach follows the SBA approach, in that 
it  uses  only  conventional  semantic  relationships  (no  N-ary 
relationships), so conventional semantic reasoning can be used 
to make deductions about security from the model. To use this 
approach for dynamic multi-stakeholder systems, the SERSCIS 
ontology
1 was constructed such that: 
  only OWL classes are used for design-time modelling, 
allowing an abstract system structure to be captured in 
terms of the relationships between types of services, 
and associated threats and controls; 
  OWL instances are used to model the run-time system 
composition,  in  terms  of  concrete  services  with 
specific controls and subject to targeted threats. 
The other design criteria for the SERSCIS approach are: 
  security expertise must be added at design time (i.e. in 
the OWL classes), so run-time models can be created 
without  expert  intervention,  yet  still  access  their 
expertise (through machine reasoning); 
  the ratio of asserted facts to inferable facts in the run-
time  model must be as low  as possible, since every 
assertion has to be constructed automatically based on 
monitoring of the running system. 
These requirements led SERSCIS to simplify the high-level 
class structure used by SBA. The SBA vulnerability class was 
dropped as it was noticed that it is most often used only to 
represent a lack of security controls. The resulting SERSCIS 
core ontology structure is shown in Fig. 1. 
                                                            
1  SERSCIS  ontologies  downloadable  at: 
http://www.serscis.eu/?page_id=317 
B.  SERSCIS Dependability Model 
The core structure from Fig. 1 provides the basis for the 
development of more specific models and analysis tools. The 
next step is to capture security expertise related to the type of 
system one is dealing with. In SERSCIS, this is known as a 
dependability model, as it includes the types of assets found in 
the  system,  and  also  the  attributes  that  make  these  assets 
dependable  or  not  (e.g.  whether  they  have  threat-induced 
behaviours). 
In  SERSCIS  we  are  concerned  with  multi-stakeholder 
applications  in  which  the  relationships between  stakeholders 
are determined at run-time via dynamic composition. Thus the 
SERSCIS dependability model describes systems in terms of 
services (and clients), taking a stakeholder-centric view (i.e. the 
model represents the system as seen by one of its stakeholders). 
Thus different asset classes are used depending on whether the 
asset is a service provided by the model stakeholder, a service 
used by that stakeholder (i.e. a resource), or a client using a 
service  from  that  stakeholder.  It  is  also  important  that  the 
dependability model takes account of the fact that in dynamic 
systems, delegation is often used. Two types of delegation are 
commonly found: 
  a user of a service shares access to the service with 
another user; or 
  a user of two services has one service interact directly 
with the other. 
The first case leads us to define a special type of Client, the 
Customer, who has a relationship with the stakeholder under 
which they can use a service. Clients who are not Customers 
have access to the service only if access is shared with them by 
the Customer. Each Customer normally has a contextualized 
endpoint through which they access a service, so each service 
is  really  a  collection  of  services  (one  per  Customer).  The 
corresponding asset class is therefore called a Service Group, 
rather  than  simply  a  Service.  The  second  case  leads  us  to 
distinguish  two  types  of  resources.  A  Client  Specified 
Resource is one specified by a client so a service can interact 
directly with it. A Provider Specified Resource is not specified 
by  a  client,  but  chosen  by  the  primary  stakeholder.  In  a 
dynamic system this is often done automatically at run time, by 
having the service select the resource from a pool of available 
resources  of  the  required  type.  This  pool  is  also  an  asset, 
represented as a Resource Group. 
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Figure 3.   Threat and control modelling 
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The SERSCIS dependability model defines a set of threat 
induced  behaviour  states  that  are  symptomatic  of  different 
types of asset compromise. A loss of confidentiality arises if 
the asset behaviour is ‘indiscreet’ while a loss of integrity is 
linked to ‘unreliable’ or ‘inaccurate’ behaviour (one signifies a 
process integrity failure, the other data integrity failure). Other 
behaviours  include  ‘overloaded’  and  ‘underperforming’ 
associated  with  availability  failures,  and  ‘unauthentic’  or 
‘unaccountable’  indicating  a  loss  of  trustworthiness,  etc. 
Threats that can give rise to such behaviour are modelled by 
their relationships to asset types, and cover the usual range of 
accidental  or  malicious  disruption  including  unauthorized 
access, impersonation (e.g. of a Customer but also potentially 
delegate  impersonation),  traffic  snooping  or  corruption,  data 
tampering  (by  unauthorized  or  erroneous  access),  resource 
shortages (e.g. in a Resource Group), deliberate or accidental 
service  overload,  and  software  bugs.  The  SERSCIS 
dependability  model  covers  different  ways  these  threats  can 
arise in the interactions between the asset types from Fig. 2, 
using  different  threat  classes  depending  on  which  asset  is 
threatened  and  which  are  affected.  Thus  impersonation  of  a 
service to fool a Customer is considered as a different threat 
from  impersonation  of  a  service  to  fool  a  Client  Specified 
Resource, etc. 
The  SERSCIS  dependability  model  also  includes  several 
control subclasses representing the types of controls typically 
found  in  a  multi-stakeholder  service-oriented  system.  These 
include access control, identification (meaning an entity has a 
way to prove its identity), authentication (a means to verify 
another  entity’s  identity  or  other  attributes),  message 
encryption and integrity verification, and a range of resource 
and  load  management  mechanisms  such  as  resource 
redundancy and failover (to prevent resource shortages), and 
SLA enforcement (to prevent overloading of services by their 
clients). Finally, the SERSCIS dependability model includes a 
set  of  Semantic  Web  Rule  Language  SWRL  rules  [14]  that 
specify what combination of controls is sufficient to block or 
mitigate each type of threat depending upon the nature of the 
control  (i.e.  proactive  or  reactive).  For  example,  suppose  a 
client tells a service to interact with another service, i.e. with a 
client specified resource (CSR). If someone else could access 
the CSR without authorization, they could interfere with the 
data exchanged between the CSR and the service. To prevent 
this threat, the CSR must deploy access control, and have a 
way to verify a user’s identity or other attributes the access 
policy requires the user to have. This in turn means the client 
must have a way to delegate access rights to other parties, and 
the service (group) needs a way to identify itself so the client 
can avoid delegating these rights to the wrong person. 
Fig. 3 shows how this threat is modelled in terms of its 
relationships  with  asset  types  and  controls.  The  diagram 
corresponds to a threat class and the associated control rule in 
the  SERSCIS  dependability  model  (actually  several  threat 
classes depending on whether the unauthorized access is used 
to  steal  or  corrupt  data  at  the  CSR).  If  one  finds  concrete 
instances of service group, client and client-specified resource 
assets related to each other as shown, one can use the control 
rule to deduce whether the system is vulnerable to this threat 
against  those  assets.  The  SERSCIS  dependability  model 
contains about 50 such threat classes, so a wide range of types 
of vulnerabilities can be detected in the running system, using 
expertise encoded in the dependability model classes. 
C.  Abstract System Model 
 
The  SERSCIS  dependability  model  provides  the  starting 
point  for  development  of  an  abstract  system  model.  This 
describes a particular system in terms of the types of assets it 
contains  and  the  relationships  between  them.  The  abstract 
system model is a design-time model of a system that will be 
composed  dynamically  at  run-time.  It  does  not  include  the 
concrete  system  deployment  and  configuration  such  as  who 
owns the assets, where they are deployed or with what security 
controls in place. The idea is that the abstract system model is 
created  at  design  time  by  a  system  expert  (not  a  security 
expert), using security expertise encoded in the dependability 
model. The resulting abstract system model is then used (along 
with the underlying dependability model) as input to a set of 
fully automated, run-time model generation and analysis tools 
connected to the system monitoring infrastructure. 
Starting  from  the  SERSCIS  dependability  model,  the 
system modeller proceeds as follows: 
  Define  sub-classes of  the  dependability  asset  classes 
from  Fig.  2,  corresponding  to  the  different  types  of 
services, clients and resources in their system. 
  Define usage relationships between the client, service 
and resource asset sub-classes. 
  Automatically generate threat sub-classes against each 
relevant combination of asset sub-classes. 
The last step can be automated because threats are defined 
in  terms  of  their  relationships  to  dependability  model  asset 
classes. The threat in Fig. 3 attacks a client specified resource 
by exploiting its relationship to client and service group assets. 
It is easy to find all combinations of client, service group and 
client specified resource sub-classes that have the same set of 
relationships.  For  each  combination,  a  corresponding  threat 
class  is  generated. Thus  the system  designer (not  a  security 
expert), does not need to know all the arcane ways in which an 
attacker might seek to compromise a multi-stakeholder system 
through these interactions. If they understand the system assets 
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Figure 5.   A-CDM Data Exchanges from a Ground Handler Perspective 
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Figure 4.   Abstract System Model of A-CDM 
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and  relationships,  SERSCIS  tools  can  be  used  to  fill  in  a 
complete set of potential threats. 
Once  the  threat  classes  have  been  generated,  the  system 
designer can optionally insert a human-readable explanation of 
the threat, information about the impact of the threat if carried 
out (high, medium or low), and an estimate of how likely it is 
that the threat will be active (a probability between 0 and 1). 
All  these  can  be  taken  from  the  underlying  dependability 
model  threat  classes,  but  it  is  advisable  to  modify  the 
explanation (at least) as otherwise it will not refer to any of the 
system-specific asset types. 
D. Concrete Model Generation 
Once  the  system  is  deployed  and  running,  a  SERSCIS 
concrete  model  generator  is  connected  to  the  monitoring 
subsystem, and used to create a model of the running system. 
This reflects the current system composition, i.e. what assets of 
each type are involved, what security controls are in place to 
protect  each  asset,  and  which  threat  induced  behaviours  are 
exhibited by each asset. Once the assets are known, instances 
of  the  corresponding  threat  classes  are  added.  The  threat 
instances represent potential threats to the system which may 
or  may  not  be  active,  and  to  which  it  may  or  may  not  be 
vulnerable. 
The concrete model is then used as input for two further 
SERSCIS tools: 
  a threat classification tool that decides to which threats 
the  system  is  vulnerable,  based  on  the  control  rules 
from the underlying SERSCIS dependability model; 
  a threat activity estimation tool that decides how likely 
it is that each threat is active, based on the types of 
induced behaviour detected in the assets. 
The  output  from  these  tools  provides  the  following 
information at run-time: 
  a  list  of  potential  threats  to  the  system,  classified 
according to whether the system is vulnerable to them; 
  estimates of how likely it is that each threat is active; 
  a description of each threat, including how severe its 
impact on the system would be; 
  a list of controls that could be introduced to block or 
mitigate a threat, and whether these are available in the 
system. 
SERSCIS  has  developed  a  simple  prototype  decision 
support tool to display this information to a run-time system 
operator. Such a tool could be integrated into an existing user 
interface, and linked to the means to deploy a control (e.g. to 
block access for a misbehaving client, or blacklist a resource 
that is implicated in an attack). Details of the concrete model 
generation  and  processing  and  the  decision  support  tool  are 
beyond the scope of this paper and will be addressed in a future 
publication.  
IV.  VALIDATION 
The SERSCIS semantic modelling approach was validated 
using an  Airport Collaborative Decision Making scenario as 
outlined in Section I. The approach is stakeholder-centric, so 
the validation case study viewed the system  from a Ground 
Handler  perspective.  A  Ground  Handler  has  the  job  of 
orchestrating services needed to get an aircraft ready for its 
next flight (e.g. refuelling, baggage handling, etc.). The data 
flows seen by a Ground Handler are summarized in Fig. 4. The 
ACISP  is  the  airport  information  service  supporting  data 
exchange  between  the  Ground  Handler,  Airlines  and  Air 
Traffic Control. The Ground Handler uses the ACISP to find 
out  when  incoming  flights  will  arrive,  and  to  pass  on  its 
predictions of when outbound flights will be ready to leave (i.e. 
the Target Off Block Time, TOBT). These are based on the 
inbound  flight  data,  and  planning  information  from  ramp 
service  providers  at  the  airport.  Eurocontrol’s  Network 
Manager  (NM)  uses  the  predictions  to  allocate  slots  in 
European  airspace.  The  Ground  Handler  does  not  interact 
directly with NM or Air Traffic Control – this is typical in a 
multi-stakeholder system where each actor may interact with 
(or even be aware of) only a subset of the others. An attacker 
who  wished  to  discredit  air  travel  by  disrupting  it  without 
causing any injuries might try to tamper with the data flowing 
to and from the ACISP.  
The SERSCIS project could not inject such attacks into a 
real  airport,  so  validation  was  carried  out  using  a  simple 
simulator based loosely on Vienna Airport. This simulated only 
airside operations (i.e. it did not include passenger check in and 
landside handling), but it did include all the actors shown in 
Fig. 4, so the effect of simulated disruptions on them could be 
detected. 
The first step was to create an abstract system model from 
the Ground Handler perspective. The asset classes for this are 
shown in Fig. 5. Note that the  NM and Air Traffic Control 
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5services are not included – this is because the model captures 
the system from the Ground Handler perspective. Since they 
have no direct contact with these services, they cannot detect 
instances of them in the monitoring data, so there is no point 
including them in the model. Note also that in this case, the 
Airlines not the Ground Handler are assumed to be Customers 
of the ACISP, so that the Ground Handler accesses ACISP data 
only when invited to do so by an Airline when they ask the 
Ground  Handler  to  turn  around  an  aircraft.  The  Ground 
Handler knows they will be given endpoints where they can 
read inbound flight data, or write outbound flight ready-time 
predictions, and these client specified resources are modelled 
as ACISP_Inbound and ACISP_Outbound sub-classes. From 
Fig. 5, it was possible to complete the abstract system model 
by  automatically  generating  threat  sub-classes  to  represent 
generic attack patterns applied to all the relevant combinations 
of asset types in the A-CDM network. This ran to over 100 
system-specific  threat  classes.  The  generated  threat  classes 
were  then  refined  by  adding  human  readable  description 
elements, severity levels and activity likelihood estimates. In 
addition,  estimates  of  the  probability  that  each  threat  would 
induce specific behaviours in the threatened and affected assets 
were compiled so detected behaviours could be used to infer 
threat activity in the run-time system. 
The SERSCIS run-time
2 tools were then connected to the 
monitoring  interfaces  of  the  airport  simulator  and  several 
scenarios executed: 
  a sunny day scenario in which no attacks are carried 
out, and the airport functions normally; 
  a scenario in which a bug is accidentally introduced in 
the Ground Handler’s turnaround prediction software; 
  a scenario in which a ramp service underestimates the 
number of crews it will need, causing it to turn up late 
when aircraft need servicing; 
  a scenario in which a malicious intruder misdirects a 
ramp  service,  causing  them  to  no  show  when  the 
inbound flight reaches the stand and needs servicing; 
  a scenario in which a malicious intruder tampers with 
the Ground Handler’s estimates of aircraft readiness by 
overwriting them at the ACISP. 
Details  of  the  various  scenarios  and  the  changes  for  the 
different failure cases are given in the following section. 
A.  Scenario details 
All  scenarios  use  a  schedule  of  124  flights  to be turned 
around during a day. All of those are regulated flights, i.e. all 
require a slot. Apart from the non-failure case, three degraded 
mode cases are listed and assessed below. The first case, the 
‘sunny day’, provides sufficient resources for all ramp service 
providers.  Hence  none  of  the  flights  experiences  a  delay  in 
turn-around.  Case  2  is  characterized  by  a  reduction  in  the 
number of workers of the baggage handler to 23. In this case 
                                                            
2  SERSCIS  run-time  tools  downloadable  at: 
http://www.serscis.eu/?page_id=317  
the baggage handler fails to honour several perform attempts 
and  the  flights  experience  substantial  delays.  In  case  3  the 
number of workers is further reduced to 18. Hence even fewer 
perform attempts get honoured. In case 4, a second baggage 
handling resource is introduced (i.e. the Ground Handler starts 
with two SLAs for the provision of baggage handling services 
with different suppliers). If the primary baggage handler fails, 
an alternative service provider can replace it. If this arises as a 
one-off problem it can be handled by service orchestration (i.e. 
failing  over  to  the  replacement  service),  though  some  delay 
will still be experienced. If the primary supplier persistently 
fails, it is better to manage the situation by excluding it from 
further  use.  This  was  done  by  specifying  a  policy  on  the 
individual baggage handler resources (as seen by the Ground 
Handler).  This  policy  sets  the  condition  of  the  service  to 
‘failed’ if there is more than one failure, and deregisters the 
service  so  preventing  it  being  available  for  selection.  This 
addresses the immediate problem of a failing supplier, but it 
reduces the number of available options for baggage handling 
to  one.  A  further  policy  is  therefore  needed  that  causes  the 
resource manager to procure a new SLA with a replacement 
baggage  service  provider.  Finally,  case  5  implements  a 
simulation of communication delays to demonstrate the effects 
of a denial of service attack on the ACISP. Due to the slow rate 
of communications, a number of flights take off outside their 
slot windows. No mitigation for this was considered in the run-
time  tests,  as  the  only  one  that  could  be  handled  by  the 
emulated components was to have redundant ACISP endpoints, 
which duplicates the mechanisms tested in Cases 1-4.  
B.  Key Performance Indicators (KPI) used in the evaluation 
To  evaluate  the  performance  of  a  ramp  service  provider 
level, two KPI are considered: arrival reliability and service 
delivery  duration.  In  the  proof-of-concept  evaluation  the 
second KPI is a constant and disregarded. The first KPI on the 
other hand is taken into account to show the effect of a reduced 
number of workers. It is assumed that the reliability decreases 
if  the  number  of  workers  available  at  a  service  provider  is 
reduced.  In  the  testbed  this  is  measured  by  the  number  of 
“perform attempts” issued to the service provider. If a service 
provider has sufficient resources, every flight requires exactly 
one perform attempt that is honoured by the service provider; 
i.e.,  the  number  of  perform  attempts  must  be  equal  to  the 
number of flights. If the provider cannot immediately honour a 
perform attempt due to a lack of workers, the perform attempts 
will  be  repeated.  Thus  the  number  increases  beyond  the 
number of flights. 
The  ramp  service performance  also  has an  effect  on  the 
ground  handler’s  KPI. The  ground  handler’s performance  is 
characterized  by  two  KPI:  TOBT  (Target  Off  Block  Time) 
accuracy and TOBT stability. TOBT accuracy is derived from 
comparing  the TOBT  with  a  reference  value (Actual  Ready 
Time, ARDT). The mean square deviation between TOBT and 
ARDT is calculated for all flights departing in a day, where the 
value for TOBT is taken at TOBT freeze time, i.e. 30 minutes 
before TOBT. TOBT stability parameter measures how stable 
the prediction mechanism of the ground handler is. For this 
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6purpose  the  average  number  of  TOBT  updates  per  flight  is 
calculated. Since the actual delivery time of the ramp services 
is a distribution with a certain variation, e.g. dictated by the 
actual  service  requirements  or  by  the  service  provider’s 
resource  trade-offs,  TOBT  accuracy  will  decrease  with  a 
reduction  in  the  number  of  workers  at  the  ramp  service 
provider. TOBT stability expresses the number of updates to 
the TOBT required for each flight. In a sunny day scenario this 
number should be 1 or close to it, i.e. once a TOBT is issued it 
will not be changed. In degraded scenarios, however, a ramp 
service will deliver late due to a lack of workers. In the testbed 
the ground handler re-issues a TOBT whenever the estimate 
deviates  from  the  previous  value  by  more  than  10  minutes. 
Hence the longer the ramp service delays its service delivery 
the more TOBT values need to be issued for a flight. 
Both above-mentioned KPIs affect the number of take-offs 
outside the slot-tolerance windows (STW), which is an overall 
KPI  for  the  A-CDM  network.  The  value  will  increase  in  a 
ripple on effect of the ramp service provider’s inaccuracy. If 
the  ramp  service  provider  fails  to  show  up  on  the  initial 
perform request, there is a risk that they will delay the turn-
around of  a  flight and cause  it  to  miss  its  slot. This  effect, 
however, might be countered in part by the available slack in 
the  turn-around  process.  A  policy  change  that  allows  the 
ground handler to replace the service provider with an alternate 
in case it fails to respond to a perform request must reverse the 
above effect.  Choosing  an  alternative  service provider  when 
the  primary  provider  failed,  will  replace  the  overall  service 
delivery reliability and thus result in fewer take-offs outside the 
STW. 
Another  KPI  is  applied  to  evaluate  the  overall  CDM 
system’s performance: the average number of slots issued per 
flight. Obviously, in the ideal case one slot is issued for a flight 
and this one is used subsequently. In less ideal situations delays 
in the turn-around prevent a flight from meeting its slot. Thus a 
new slot has to be issued, potentially wasting the previous one 
if it cannot be claimed by another flight. The longer the delay 
of a turn-around, e.g. induced by a lack of workers at a ramp 
service providers, the more slots must be issued for a flight
3. 
C.  Experiment results 
The KPI obtained from the above scenarios are listed in 
Table 1. The results shown here clearly indicate that the chosen 
KPIs are meaningful for the testbed and the scenario and that 
verification and validation of the testbed succeeded. The KPI 
“perform  attempts”  was  expected  to  increase  if  a  service 
provider  does  not  have  sufficient  resources  to  honour  all 
requests in parallel. In this case some of the requests must be 
repeated, which means a larger figure. When introducing the 
                                                            
3 In the testbed the ground handler uses a simple strategy to update 
the TOBT. A new estimate for TOBT is calculated, and the TOBT 
is updated if the new estimate is more than 10 minutes after the 
previous TOBT. Note that in the current simulation every TOBT 
change automatically results in the issuance of a new slot. For this 
reason, the number of slots per flight is equal to the number of 
TOBT updates.  
possibility to choose an alternative provider in case the first 
one  fails  to  honour  requests,  the  total  number  of  perform 
attempts should decrease again. This is exactly the behaviour 
of the testbed. Case 2 and also case 3 exhibit a significantly 
larger number of perform attempts than the sunny day case 1. 
With the introduction of an alternative service provider in case 
4, the number of request drops close to the value of the sunny 
day case again. Note that it is still slightly larger than in the 
sunny day case, because additional perform requests are issued 
(and not honoured) while the alternative provider is being set 
up. Hence the KPI provides meaningful characteristics of the 
testbed and the testbed shows the expected behaviour.  
TABLE I.   KPI VALUES 
Scenario 
Scenario 
Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4  Case 5 
Baggage 
perform 
attempts 
249  556  961  266  249 
Average  TOBT 
error  4 min  14 min  49 min  4 min  4 min 
Average  TOBT 
updates  per 
flight 
1  1.5  2.7  1  1 
Average 
number  of  slots 
issued 
1  1.5  2.7  1  1 
Take-offs 
outside STW  0%  15%  31%  0%  13% 
 
The  TOBT-related  KPIs  reflect  the  quality  of  service 
delivery by a ramp service provider. With a decreasing number 
of workers in cases 2 and 3, the TOBT accuracy decreases as 
well and the required number of updates to this value per flight 
increases accordingly. When the ground handler has the option 
to choose an alternative service provider in case 4, the trend 
reverses and case 4 delivers the same performance as the sunny 
day  case  1.  Similarly,  the  number  of  slots  issued  per  flight 
increases with the number of TOBT updates per flight. In case 
4,  in  which  TOBT  does  not  get  updated,  only  one  slot  is 
required as in case 1. 
The last KPI, which was assesses in the testbed evaluation, 
is the percentage of take-offs outside the slot-tolerance window 
(STW). In the case of a sufficient number of workers at all 
service providers (case 1), none of the flights should miss its 
slot
4.  Hence  the  KPI  must  be  0%.  With  turn-arounds  being 
delayed due to an insufficient number of workers at one of the 
service  providers,  flights  will  miss  their  slots  and  take  off 
outside the STW. For this reason the value increases to 19% in 
case 2. When an alternative service provider steps in to take 
over the tasks from a failed provider as in case 3, turn-arounds 
are on time again. The percentage of missed slots falls back to 
0%  again.  In  the  event  of  communication  delays  with  the 
ACISP  we  see  the  percentage  of  take-offs  outside  the  slot 
tolerance window increase in proportion to the delay. This is 
                                                            
4 The limited capacity of taxiways and runways might cause flights to 
miss  their  slots  despite  a  timely  turn-around,  but  this  is  not 
modelled in the testbed. 
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7caused by delays in communications resulting in windows of 
opportunity to be missed. 
D. Validation conclusions 
Tests showed that if left untreated, the injected faults all 
cause  the  performance  of  the  airport  to  be  degraded:  more 
flights  take  off  late,  and  Eurocontrol  wastes  airspace  by 
allocating slots that the Airlines cannot use. Moreover, all the 
faults lead to inaccurate forecasts to be passed to NM (in the 
last case the Ground Handler’s forecast is accurate, but it is 
then corrupted at ACISP). However, the SERSCIS monitoring 
tools were able to detect these different threats and correctly 
diagnose them based on the monitoring data available. These 
experiments demonstrate that the SERSCIS approach provides 
a practical solution for security risk analysis in a dynamically 
composed,  multi-stakeholder  system.  Security  expertise  is 
captured  beforehand  in  the  SERSCIS  dependability  model 
OWL  classes,  and these can  be  used by  a  system  expert  at 
design-time to create an abstract system model. This captures 
the  structure  of  the  system  but  does  not  specify  how  many 
assets it contains, where they are deployed or what security 
controls they have. The abstract system model provides inputs 
to run-time semantic monitoring tools, where the knowledge 
encoded in the OWL classes is used to automatically determine 
system threat activity and system vulnerabilities. 
V.  FUTURE WORK 
The SERSCIS semantic modelling approach was validated 
using  a  subset  of  the  European  Air  Traffic  Management 
system. As outlined in Section I, it was applied to an Airport 
Collaborative Decision Making scenario at a major European 
airport. The authors are aware that A-CDM is a relatively small 
part of the overall ATM system, but it exhibits characteristics 
that make it well suited as a test bed: 
  involvement of several stakeholders, coming from the 
core ATM as well as other domains; 
  involvement  of  several  technical  systems 
interconnected  by  various  communication 
infrastructures; and 
  closely linked processes, in which the disruption of one 
sub-process  without  treatment  will  lead  to  major 
disruptions of the entire system. 
These properties also apply to the entire European ATM 
system. At the same time, the sheer complexity and size of the 
European  ATM  system  forestalls  any  security  approach  that 
tries  to  tackle  the  system  as  a  whole.  Rather  a  hierarchical 
methodology will be required. Hence future work will be to 
scale up the approach described here. 
The SERCIS project ends in late 2012. In the final year, 
improvements to the SERSCIS core and dependability model 
have been made to make the model suitable for future research 
work.  Improvements to the core ontology (Fig. 1) allow us to 
model physical and electronic attacks on airport connectivity 
and  spaces.  These  include  the  ability  of  actors  (including 
intruders)  to  move  around  the  airport,  the  use  of  private 
networks to support communications with and in the airport, 
and  the  potential  for  physical  or  electronic  attacks  on 
communication assets as well as services that use them.  
A  final  rationalization  of  the  threat  model  has  been  to 
describe  threats  according  to  their  target,  action  and 
consequence,  based  on  [18].  This  provides  a  basis  for 
evaluating the coverage of the threat model and makes it easily 
extensible  for  different  types  of  systems  to  provide  threat-
centric, run-time security analysis. 
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